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IN THE SUPREME COURTf OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM ROBERT PILKEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CASE NO. 860154 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The three following issues are presented on appeal in the 
above entitled case: 
1. Whether Appellant William Robert Pilkey was entrapped 
by an undercover agent employed by the Box Elder Sheriff's 
office, and therefore would not have been convicted of any 
crime. 
2. Whether Appellant William Robert Pilkey should have 
been charged, convicted, and sentenced for a lesser included 
class B misdemeanor offense rather than a second degree felony, 
3. Whether Appellant Pilkey1s due process rights were 
violated as a result of prejudicial error during the course of 
the trial warranting a reversal of his conviction and the 
granting of a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Undercover agent, Miss Sonie Rector, first came into 
contact with Mr. Pilkey shortly after her arrival in Tremonton, 
Utah, and engagement by the Box Elder County's Sheriff's office 
on September 23, 1984. (R. 27) As soon as she started 
frequenting Mr. Pilkey's club, she began developing a 
relationship with him (R. 28, 117, 121) and initiated discussion 
about drugs. (R. 52, 105) 
Although Mr. Pilkey was never under suspicion of using or 
dealing drugs (R. 95), Miss Rector began requesting that Mr. 
Pilkey get her "something to keep her awake" and appealed to him 
numerous times with persistent requests to help her out. She 
did everything whe could to convince him that she was in 
desperate need of "something to keep her going". (R. 72) She 
called him practically everyday in her campaign of harassment 
and pleading. Between September 23, and November 9, 1984, she 
telephoned Mr. Pilkey approximately 35 times. While during the 
two-week period between October 16 and November 9, 1984, she 
came into Mr. Pilkey's club at least ten times to request his 
help in getting something to keep her going. (R. 49-54, 90, 111-
114, 127, 137, 142-143) 
Prior to the commencement of her attempt to get Mr. Pilkey 
to obtain drugs for her, she flaunted her other high-money drug 
dealing. (R. 118) 
-2-
The event for which Mr. Pilkey was tried took place on 
November 8 and 9, 1984. He was charged by way of information 
with violating Section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code Annotated (as 
amended), in that he accepted a gun from Miss Rector, the 
undercover agent, in exchange for an uncontrolled substance sold 
legally over-the-counter called ephedrine or caffeine pills. 
(R. 16) Miss Rector had obtained the gun from the Sheriff's 
office for use as a decoy and initiated discussion of the gun 
and the possible exchange. (R. 64, 70) 
Mr. Pilkey was brought to trial on June 17, 1985, was 
convicted of a second degree felony, and was sentenced to five 
years in prison on July 29, 1985. Defendant's counsel filed a 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment on August 2, 1985, and a Motion 
for a New Trial on August 5, 1985, both subsequently denied, 
requesting a new trial on the grounds that (i) Defendant should 
have been charged and tried under the lesser included offense 
set forth in Section 58-37b-4 or in the alternative to be 
sentenced thereunder according to a class B misdemeanor, and 
(ii) Defendant was denied his due process rights as a result of 
prejudicial error during the trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defense of entrapment is defined by Section 76-2-303 of 
the Utah Code Annotated (as amended) and the cases interpreting 
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that statute. Courts are required to employ an objective test 
which focuses on the police conduct and not the propensities or 
predisposition of the defendant. Indications that entrapment 
has occurred include initiation and proposal of the illegal 
activity by the agent, persistent requests by the agent, the 
development of a close personal relationship with the defendant 
with the purpose of inducing illegal activity to obtain evidence 
for prosecution, and no prior suspicions of similar activities 
by the defendant in the past. In this case, where all of these 
factors were present, Appellant Pilkey was entrapped by 
undercover agent Sonnie Rector. He therefore should not have 
been convicted of any crime and his conviction should be 
overturned. 
In the event that Mr. Pilkey's conviction is not 
overturned, the charge, conviction, and sentencing of Mr. Pilkey 
should have been under the lesser included offense, a class B. 
misdemeanor rather than a second degree felony. The Court has, 
on more than one occasion, ruled that where two statutes with 
different penalties cover the same act, the violator is entitled 
to the lesser punishment. Appellant's sentence should therefore 
be reduced to comport with the lesser penalty. 
During the course of the trial, Mr. Pilkey!s attorney 
specifically requested, in the Judge's chambers, that the fact 
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of a prior charge against Mr. Pilkey for illegal gambling not 
be raised during testimony. The Judge ruled that such evidence 
should not be submitted to the jury. (R. 152) Despite this 
ruling by the Judge, at least one juror reported that she had 
based her vote for conviction on the Defendant's past gambling 
charge. This is prejudicial error and warrants a reversal and 
the granting of a new trial for the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT PILKEY WAS ENTRAPPED BY AN UNDERCOVER AGENT AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED OF ANY CRIME 
Section 76-2-303 of the Utah Code Annotated (as amended) 
defines the defense of entrapment as occurring 
when a law enforcement officer or person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commis-
sion of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the com-
mission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial 
risk that the offense would be committed by one not other-
wise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person 
an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute 
entrapment. 
Cases interpreting this statute have further clarified the 
definition of the entrapment defense. In State v. Taylor, 599 
P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the defendant was convicted for the crime 
of distributing for value a controlled substance. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the convicition and held that the defense 
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of entrapment was avilable where: the defendant and the 
undercover agent had cohabited prior to the alleged offense and 
remained close friends after they separated; they had injected 
heroin together; they had shared a bed during the month the 
agent had contacted the defendant to request that he obtain 
heroin for her; and the defendant could empathize with the 
agent, who pleaded for assistance in obtaining the substance. 
In Taylor, the Court specifically rejected a subjective 
test that would look into the predisposition of the defenant to 
commit the offense, and adopted the objective view of 
entrapment. Under the objective test, the focus is not on the 
propensities of the defendant, but on whether the police conduct 
falls below standards for the proper use of government power. 
The objective test denies the use of decoys, such as a gun in 
our case, to present actively, inducements for the purpose of 
luring a person into the commission of an offense. The 
government is not permitted to engage in the manufacture of 
crime. Id_ at 500. 
If the intention that the particular crime be committed 
originates with the police, then the defense of entrapment is 
avilable. _Ic3 at 501. No matter what the defendant's past 
record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to 
which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police 
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conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated 
by an advanced society. Permissible police conduct does not 
vary according to the particular defendant concerned. Id_ at 
502. Some of the action that indicate entrapment by a police 
agent include appeals to sympathy, pity or friendship, pleas of 
illness, the possibility of exorbitant gain, inordinate 
inducements, and the use of methods of persuasion or 
inducements. Ijd at 502-504. 
The Court in State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), 
employing the newly-adopted objective test, reversed a jury 
conviction, and held that reasonable doubt existed as to whether 
the offense committed, distribution of a controlled substance, 
was a product of the defendants initiative, or was induced by 
persistent requests of an undercover agent. 
In Kourbelas, as in the case at bar, the agent initiated 
discussion of the selling of marijuana. The agent, after 
telling defendant that there could be money to be made, asked 
the defendant if he could get some or if he knew some way of 
getting some. When defendant said "I'll see what I can do", the 
agent asked for his name, address, and telephone number, and 
defendant told the agent to get in touch. Within the next 
month, the agent called defendant six times asking about the 
marijuana. Finally, the defendant called the agent, after 
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repeatedly telling the agent that he was trying, informed the 
agent that two pounds were available and sold them to the 
agent. _Id at 1239. 
The Court stated that the following facts were significant 
in determining that the defense of entrapment was available: 
(i) the agent first suggested the purchase; (ii) the agent 
renewed contact to ask again and called the defendant at least 
five times in attempting to purchase the substance; (iii) and 
there was no evidence that the defendant had previously 
possessed or dealt in the drug. Id_ at 1240. In the case at 
bar, all of these facts are present, as can be seen from the 
recitation of the facts above and a reading of the transcript of 
the trial in the district court. In fact, additional evidence 
was given, that Miss Rector, undercover agent, had established a 
personal relationship with Mr. Pilkey and had evoked his 
sympathy by telling him that she was in desperate need of 
something to keep her going. She even told Mr. Pilkey that she 
had had to resort to the use of horse pain killer and had shot 
it into her veins. (R. 113) 
Another case substantially similar to Kourbelas, is State 
v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), in which the Court also 
reversed a conviction, because the defendant had been induced by 
an undercover agent to obtain for him and sell him a controlled 
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substance. The Court reflected on the similarities of the two 
cases and stated that it was the agent who first approached the 
defendant, with no reason to believe that the defendant used or 
sold drugs, and suggested the purchase. The agent reinitiated 
contact, and finally after a third request by the agent, the 
defendant provided the substance. Defendant testified that he 
did this because he wanted to be a friend to the undercover 
agent. Id_ a t 4 0 6 . 
The most recent cases on entrapment, State v. Erickson, 722 
P.2d 756 (Utah 1986), and State v. Udell, 45 U.A.R. 7 
(10/28/86), are distinguishable from the Kourbelas and Sprague 
and the present case, and support Mr. Pilkeyfs view that he was 
entrapped by Miss Rector. In these two most recent cases, no 
personal relationship had been established, the defendant had 
invited the agent to his office in Erickson, and the defendants 
in both cases were known to the police as people who had 
previously been involved with the illegal use and/or sale of 
controlled substances. 
Since the facts of the case against Mr. Pilkey are directly 
analogous to those in the cases cited above where the Court 
reversed conviction in similar situations, and all of the 
elements of the defense of entrapment are present, his 
conviction should be reversed. 
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II 
APPELLANT PILKEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED, CONVICTED, AND 
SENTENCED UNDER THE STATUTORY PROVISION FOR 
A LESSOR INCLUDED OFFENSE 
Appellant Pilkey was charged by way of information with 
having violated Section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code Annotated (as 
amended), in that he allegedly negotiated to distribute a 
controlled substance for value and then distributed another 
substance, ephedrine or caffeine pills, in lieu of that 
substance. He was tried, convicted of a second degree felony, 
and sentenced to five years in prison. 
Appellant's alleged crime is also covered by U.C.A., 
Section 58-37b-4, which provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any 
person to ... distribute ... an imitation controlled substance. 
Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor and upon conviction may be imprisoned for a term 
not exceeding six months, fined not more than $299, or both". 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when an 
individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two 
overlapping statutes, the statute with the lesser penalty should 
apply. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969); 
State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984). In State v. Crick, 675 
P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983), the Court stated, in passing, that it 
recently had "affirmed the principle that a defendant may be 
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convicted of a lesser included offense even where the lesser 
offense has not been charged and the defendant has not requested 
such an instruction", and cited State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 145 
(Utah 1983) for the proposition. 
In Hill, the defendant appealed a jury conviction of theft 
by deception, a second degree felony, under U.C.A. Section 76-6-
405. He had received cash from an undercover agent in exchange 
for an ounce of baking soda that he had represented as "good 
cocaine". The Court held that by exchanging the baking soda for 
money, the defendant had committed the distribution of an 
imitation controlled substance under U.C.A., Section 58-37b-4 as 
a class B misdemeanor, the same section under which the 
Appellant in this case should have been sentenced. 
Chief Justice Hall, in his dissent, objected to the 
decision that baking soda was a contemplated imitation 
controlled substance under the statute. He cited the Prefatory 
Note to the Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act, after 
which our statute is patterned, and explained that "the clear 
thrust of the Act is to reach dealers who sell tablets ... that 
'clearly resemble or even duplicate the appearance of well-
known, brand name controlled substances, but which contain only 
non-controlled over-the-counter drugs such as caffeine, 
ephedrine, ... or some combination of these substances1." Hill 
at 45. (emphasis addedj 
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As such Defendant was over charged and if any conviction is 
upheld it would be for the lesser offense as defined in 58-37b-4-
U.C.A. 
Ill 
AS A RESULT OF PREJUDICIAL ERRORr APPELLANT WAS DENIED 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED 
Prejudicial error has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court to mean that error is reversible if the Court is persuaded 
that without the error there was a "reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Fontanaf 680 
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). 
During the course of the trial, Appellant's counsel 
requested, in chambers, that the Judge order the State not to 
raise the issue of Appellant's prior misdemeanor gambling 
charge. The Judge agreed and even recognized the damaging 
nature of such testimony. Later in the trial, the State cross-
examined Mr. Pilkey about the reason why his club had been 
closed, to which Defendant's attorney objected. (R. 133) It is 
Appellant's contention that the State's attorney knew of the 
extensive local publicity about the closing of Mr. Pilkey's club 
and was giving the opportunity to the jury to presume that Mr. 
Pilkey was lying about the reason for the closing. 
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Appellant's view is further supported by the affidavit of 
his attorney, submitted together with his Motion for New Trial, 
dated August 5, 1985, in which Mr. Brady attests that he was 
informed that at least one juror based her vote for conviction 
on the fact that the Defendant had been charged with gambling 
and that was why his club was closed. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that Appellant would not 
have been convicted if the prejudicial error had not occurred. 
Appellant was convicted because at least one juror based her 
decision on a matter that was ruled out of order and possibly 
prejudicial by the Judge. Therefore, Appellant's due process 
right to a fair trial was violated, and his conviciton should be 
reversed and a new trial granted. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant asserts that he was entrapped by an 
undercover agent and therefore he should not have been convicted 
of any crime. If his defense of entrapment is rejected, 
Defendant/Appellant has demonstrated that he should have been 
sentenced under the lesser included offense of a class B 
misdemeanor. He has also shown that prejudicial error occurred 
during the course of the trial which would warrant the reversal 
of his conviction. 
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Defendant/Appellant respectfully submits that his 
conviction be reversed or in the alternative that this case be 
remanded with an order that he be sentenced for a class B 
misdemeanor rather than a second degree felony. 
DATED this day of January, 1987. 
DOUGLAS M. BRADY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
300 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 465 
Logan, Utah 84321 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellant to, David L. 
Wilkinson, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and one (1) copy to Jon J. Bunderson, 45 North First 
East, Brigham City, Utah 84302, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, postage prepaid this day of January, 
1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM ROBERT PILKEY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS M. BRADY 
NO. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
Douglas M. Brady, being first duly sworn and deposed, 
states: 
1. That I am the attorney of record in this matter. 
2. That I am competent to testify as to the facts in this 
matter if called to trial. 
3. That after the trial in the instant cause of action, I 
had a conversation with Kenny Adams, one of the Detectives from 
the Sheriff's Department who worked on this case. That 
Detective Adams informed me that one of the jurors had told them 
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knew the license for the Hide-a-way Club previously operated by 
the Defendant had been revoked due to his conviction on a 
Misdemeanor Gambling charge. 
4. That there was no evidence before the court pertaining 
to the Misdemeanor Gambling charge and as such the juror has 
relied upon improper evidence to sustain their verdict. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1985. 
Douglas M. Brady 






I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit to Jon Bunderson, 45 North First 
East, Brigham City, Utah this 5th day of August, 1985. 
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